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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES D. KENT,
Grievant/Petitioner,

]
i
;

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

vs.

;

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, and the
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
OF THE STATE OF UTAH,

]
;
]i
]

Case No.

Agency/Respondents.

]i
,

10 CSRB/H.O. 138 (Step 5)
4 CSRB 40
(Step 6)

92-0676 CA

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

APPEAL FROM THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE CAREER
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, CASE NUMBER 10 CSRB/H.O. 138
(Step 5), 4 CSRB 40 (Step 6).

I.
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as amended)
confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court or other
appellate Courts, as provided by statute, to review all final
agency actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1953, as amended) grants
jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals to review the final
1

orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of State agencies.

This appeal is from a formal

adjudicative proceeding conducted by the Career Service Review
Board.
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the Career Service Review Board (herein CSRB)

abuse its discretion by affirming the Department's reliance on
"professional standards" as a basis for discipline, when the
"professional standards" were never formally adopted by the
Department, were not in writing and were not disseminated to
employees?
Standard of Review:

This issue is one of general law and is

to be analyzed for correctness with no deference given the
agency's decision.

Savage Industries v. Utah State Tax

Commission, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
2.

Did the Career Service Review Board abuse its

discretion in determining a nexus existed between Kent's offduty misconduct and his employment when the misconduct did not
violate any specific Departmental policies and which occurred
five (5) years prior to the disciplinary action?
Standard of Review:

This issue is one of general law and is

2

to be analyzed for correctness with no deference given the
agency's decision.
3.

Id.

Did the Career Service Review Board abuse its

discretion in holding that Kent may be terminated from his
existing position for misconduct that occurred while he
occupied a different position with the Department?
Standard of Review:

This issue is one of general law and is

to be analyzed for correctness with no deference given the
agency's decision.

Id.
III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are applicable to the
case on appeal and each of the following are set forth
verbatim in the Addendum submitted herewith:
a.

Utah Code Anno. 67-19-18 (1953, as amended).

b.

Utah Code Anno. 77-5-1 (1953, as amended).

c.

Utah Administrative Code, Rule 468-11-1(1),

d.

Utah Administrative Code, Rule 468-11-2(1).
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. CASE NATURE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION

3

Kent was hired by the Department as an Accountant in
1984.

He was subsequently promoted and became a Field

Auditor.

Kent's employment with the Department was

terminated on December 6, 1991, by virtue of a written
decision issued by the head of the Department, Floyd Astin.
Kent appealed his dismissal to the Career Service Review
Board and the CSRB Administrator appointed Sherrie Guyon as
the Step 5 Formal Hearing Officer.

A hearing was held before

Ms. Guyon on February 7, 1992, and she issued her Decision
affirming Kent's dismissal from employment on March 31, 1992.
Kent appealed to the CSRB, which adopted Ms. Guyon's Findings
of Fact and affirmed her Decision in total.
Kent appeals from the Decision of the Step 5 Hearing
Officer and the CSRB upholding his dismissal from employment
with the Department.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

All citations will be to the transcript of the Step 5
evidentiary hearing and Exhibits received therein.
Charles Kent (Kent) was hired by the Department of
Employment Security (the Department) on October 9, 1984. as an
Accountant, Grade 17. Kent was hired in a non-career service
position known as time limited salary, which means Kent was
simply hired on a conrractual/at-wiil basis.
4

T.13, lines 14-

25.

Kent was promoted to Accountant, Grade 19, on April 22,

1985.

T.19, lines 5-6.

On January 13, 1986, Kent's employee

status was changed from at-will to career service status,
which gave Kent certain vested rights.

T.16, lines 11-12.

On

October 6, 1986, Kent was promoted, this time to Accountant,
Grade 21.

T.19, lines 9-10.

In January of 1989, Kent applied

for the position of Field Auditor, Grade 21, and he was
selected for the position.
22.

T.28, lines 1-15, T.106, lines 18-

Kent's position was thereafter reclassified as a Field

Auditor II, Grade 25.

T.18, lines 16-20.

In March of 1990,

Kent was transferred from the Salt Lake City office to the
Clearfield office of the Department where he worked in
handling claims and placement.

Kent transferred back to the

Field Auditor position in the Salt Lake City office in July,
1990.

This transfer was not disciplinary in nature but was

the result of budget difficulties within the Department.
T.20, lines 3-8; T.35, lines 10-18; T.107, lines 1-14.

Kent

continued in the Field Auditor position at the Salt Lake City
office until he was disciplined.
On May 1, 1991, Kent was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury
wherein he faced ten (10) felony charges for allegedly
fraudulently endorsing ten (10) Social Security checks made
out to his deceased father *

Exhibit G-l.
5

At the time Kent

was indicted, one Dean Kimber was the Chief of Contributions,
which was the section of the Department where Kent was
employed.

Don Avery became Chief of Contributions in August

of 1991, just prior to the time Kent appeared in Federal Court
on the foregoing charges.

T.54, lines 7-19.

Prior to being

promoted to Chief of Contributions, Mr. Avery also knew that
Kent had a scheduled Court appearance in the fall.
lines 7-13.

T.47,

Mr. Avery also occupied the position of Field

Audit Manager (prior to his promotion), which is a mid-level
supervisory position between Kent and the Chief of
Contributions.

T.27, lines 12-24.

Kent testified he specifically told Dean Kimber that he
(Kent) had an August 8, 1991, Court date.

T.lll, lines 10-15.

On August 8, 1991, Petitioner pled guilty to one (1)
misdemeanor charge of forging an endorsement on a treasury
check and the ten (10) felony charges were dismissed.
G-3.

Exhibit

The foregoing crime occurred in the 1985-86 timeframe

according to Mr. Avery.

T.57, lines 12-14.

The Department had actual knowledge of Kent's Court date
of August 8th inasmuch as Evan Mattinson (Supervisor cf
Investigations for the Department) had called Don Avery
beforehand and advised him of the same.

T.55, lines 12-16.

In fact, Mr. Mattinson instructed an individual named Vincent
6

Iturbe to attend Mr. Kent's hearing.

T.55, lines 17-25.

After entering his plea, Kent had a moment to talk with
Mr. Iturbe and Mr. Iturbe told Kent that "he (Mr. Iturbe) was
going to prepare a report, he'd take care of it."
lines 24-15; T.113, line 1.

It was because of this discussion

that Kent did not advise Don Avery of the plea.
2-4.

T.112,

T.113, lines

Kent and Don Avery thereafter met and discussed the

plea.

As a result of this discussion, Don Avery wrote to his

superior on September 13, and stated:
"He [Kent] still contends to be innocent
and the only reason he pleaded guilty was
upon the advice of his attorney. His
attorney counseled him that pleading
guilty to a misdemeanor should have no
consequences upon his current
employment." Grievant's Exhibit 2.
On October 4, 1991, the Department issued a Notice of
Intent to discipline in which it asserted the legal authority
for the discipline was as follows:
"You are advised of this disciplinary
action 'to advance the good of the public
interest' [Utah Code 67-19-18(1)], R46811-1.3(a), and pursuant to the following
under R468-11-1 for noncompliance with
professional standards adopted by this
Department." Department Exhibit 3.
(Emphasis supplied).
Kent filed an appeal to Floyd Astin, Administrator of the
Department, who framed the issue as follows:

7

"The issue in this matter is whether you should
be dismissed from the Department and state
service to advance the good of the public
interest for noncompliance with professional
standards adopted by this Department. Specifically- should you be dismissed for
having been convicted of a crime of moral
turpitude while employed by this Department?"
(Emphasis supplied). Department Exhibit 1.
In fact, the only "professional standards" relied upon by
the Department are those contained in the Supervisor's
Handbook,

The pertinent portions of that Handbook are set

forth in the Addendum.

Moreover, Mr. Astin testified that

professional standards are based on "my judgment."

He

stated:
"There is just certain conduct in my
judgment;, certain conduct that employees
are expected to follow and it's JUST:
understood. In human relationships, yoa
just don't do certain things. You don't
have to spell them ail out." T.82, lines
9-13.
Kent was never given a copy of the Supervisor's
Handbook, because it "is not distributed to anyone below
management level,"

T.59, lines 18-19, and Kent testified he

was unaware of the provision therein concerning dismissal for
conviction of a crime.

T.106, lines 3-6.

It is undisputed that Petitioner had no prior
disciplinary history and his performance evaluations were
successful or superior.

8

V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I;

The Department has the burden of proving the

legal bases for imposing discipline.

The Department sought

to discipline Kent for violation of professional standards
adopted b;/ it.

The Department never proved, however, that: any

objective, identifiable standards exist nor that Kent was ever
made aware of the same.

The Department therefore failed to

carry its burden and Kent should be reinstated with back pay.
POINT II: The DeSpain decision of this Court requires
state agencies to prove a nexus between off-duty misconduct
and violation of specific policies.

The Agency never

presented any evidence of specific policies but the Hearing
Officer and the CSRB ignored this requirement by finding a
notion of "general11 policies.

The Hearing Officer and the

CSRB therefore abused its discretion by failing to find the
proper nexus.

Kent also asserts DeSpain should be modified to

add a time limit of one (1) year in which management can
impose discipline from the date of misconduct.
POINT III:

U.C.A. 67-19-18 sets forth numerous types of

misconduct that may constitute a basis for discipline.
statute ends, however, with the phrase "in office."
maintains this phrase should be interpreted to mean
9

The

Kent

misconduct while occupying a given position,

Kent maintains

that because he held a different position when the misconduct
occurred, he cannot be disciplined in his current position.
VI.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DEPARTMENT NEVER CARRIED ITS BURDEN OF
PROVING KENT VIOLATED PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT NEVER
PROVED IT HAD ADOPTED PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS.
Don Avery testified that he prepared the "Notification of
Intent to DisciplineM (Department Exhibit 3), which provides:
"You are advised of this disciplinaryaction 'to advance the good of the public
interest' [Utah Code 67-19-18(1)], R.46811-1.3(3), and pursuant to the following
under R.268-11-1 for noncompliance with
professional standards adopted by this
Department." (Emphasis supplied).
The notification clearly asserts that professional
standards had been "adopted by this Department" and suggests a
written document that a person could simply examine.

The

difficulty, however, is that the only documentation concerning
"professional standards" is, purportedly, located in the
Supervisor's Handbook, T.58, lines 5-8, and that document is
not distributed to employees, T.59, lines 18-19.

Moreover,

the Department's Handbook does not expressly set forth any
10

item called "professional standards" but simply provides as
follows:
"Dismissals for Cause.
Failure to satisfactorily complete
probation period.
Failure to report to work.
Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Negligence, inefficiency or unfitness to
perform duties.
Violation of Department or State
regulations.
Gross misconduct or insubordination."
See Page 12-2 of Supervisor's Handbook set
forth in the Addendum.
Mr. Astin's decision to dismiss Kent relies specifically
on the Supervisor's Handbook and counsel for the Department
asserted Kent's conviction as the grounds for dismissal in
opening argument at the Step 5 hearing:
"We feel that: the decision is correct and
ask that it be affirmed on the grounds
that the conduct that Mr. Kent engaged in
and his subsequent conviction by way of
the guilty plea to that conduct has made
him, bluntly and simply put, unfit to
perform the duties for which he was
originally hired and for which he was last
employed." (Emphasis supplied). T.9,
lines 6-12.
Mr. Astin, however, changed his position in the Step 5
hearing by asserting that "professional standards" has some
generic meaning:
"Q. All right. Can you tell me how I can
get my hands on those professional
11

standards?

Where are they?

A, I think it's just my judgment. It's
common knowledge that you don't have
people working for you that are convicted
of falsifying records when you have them
going on and checking whether or not
employers are doing that sort of thing.
That's a standard that I think would be
understood by anybody that did that type
of work, whether it's written or not.'1
(Emphasis supplied). T.80, lines 14-24.
The Step 5 Hearing Officer accepted this notion of a
generalized set of professional standards:
"Grievant asserted that there were no
specific rules of professional conduct
delineated in the Department's rules and
regulations and that, therefore, it was an
error for the Department to cite the
violation of professional policies as a
reason for discipline. The Administrator
testified, however, that he feels there is
certain professional conduct that is
"understood" in general by employees in
positions such as Grievant's. It seems to
be generally understood that an employee's
reputation for honesty and trustworthiness
must be without question. This is
especially true in a sensitive position
such as Grievant's when trust fund moneys
are involved.
Decision of Step 5 Hearing
Officer at page 6.
Intriguingly, the CSRB (in its Step 6 Decision; admitted
the Supervisor's Handbook does not constitute professional
standards but instead chose to adopt a "new basis for
disciplining Kent - violation of work place policies:"
"4. The Department's Supervisor Handbook
lists as a cause for dismissal:
12

"Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude." (Grvt. Exh. 1; Agency Exh. 4)
Appellant, who was not a supervisor or
manager, had not received a copy of the
handbook during his years of employment
with the Department. Appellant averred
that he had no knowledge of these
professional standards prior to dismissal
proceedings (T.105). Admittedly, this
handbook does not apply the term
"professional standards," but it
explicitly sets forth several grounds as
dismissal for cause, including a
conviction for a crime of moral
turpitude, Human Resource Management
Rules (July 1991 edition), at R.468-11-1,
states in part: "Noncompliance with these
rules, departmental safety policies,
professional standards adopted by a
department, work place policies, ...
failure to advance the good of the public
interest shall be cause for disciplinary
action," (Emphasis in original). This
provision of the Human Resource Management
Rules is appiicabJe to all career service
employees, including Kent, regardless of
v/hether one has personal knowledge of the
rule or not. There are certain moral
standards, such as integrity,
trustworthiness, and honesty, which need
not be written into an employer's policies
and work place rules. The public
employing agency may reasonably expect
adherence to such unwritten universal
moral standards, which if breached, would
substantially tarnish an employee's
reputation and strain if not rupture the
employment relationship." (Emphasis
supplied). CSRB Decision at page 9. See
Addendum.
Thus, Kent was originally disciplined for violation of
professional standards purportedly contained in the
Supervisor's Handbook.

When that angle did not work, the
13

Department attempted to "re-shuffle" the deck by asserting
that there exists some set of professional standards that
exist in Mr. Astin's mind.

The CSRB (sua sponte) then took

this charade one step further, saying we have a different
basis for affirming Kent's dismissal - work place policies.
What does all this mean?

It means simply that the

Department has not carried its burden of proof, by
substantial evidence, that professional standards ever
existed!

Kent obviously could not have violated standards

that did not exist and the Department's attempt to discipline
Kent is void.
IL
THE DEPARTMENT HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING A
NEXUS BETWEEN THE MISCONDUCT AND
GRIEVANT'S JOB DUTIES.
In Utah Dept. of Corrections v. DeSpain, 824 P.2d 439
(Utah App. 1991), this Court held there must be nexus between
off-duty misconduct and the ability to perform job duties in
order to sustain a termination.

The Court stated:

"Courts often find a nexus between offduty conduct and job performance,
particularly where the position requires
high morals, control, and discipline and
the off-duty conduct is in violation of
specific employment policies." DeSpain,
at 444.
This Court thus required proof of two (2) elements in
14

order to demonstrate nexus, to-wit:

1) the position must

involve high morals, and 2) the off-duty conduct violates
specific policies.

Kent asserts that neither the Hearing

Officer or the CSRB addressed the second element of DeSpain's
nexus request.

The Step 5 Hearing Officer's Decision

regarding the nexus issue asserts:
"The Agency provided the necessary link
between Grievant's actions and the
necessity to discipline him for them, by
showing that Grievant's failure to
communicate during the indictment process,
in addition to the guilty plea, both
contributed to the Agency's loss of
confidence in Grievant and to the loss of
Grievant's credibility to function as an
effective employee in this sensitive
position requiring unquestioned
trustworthiness and honesty. The Hearing
Officer finds rhat the Agency carried its
burden by providing substantial evidence
to show that a nexus existed between
Grievant's actions on the job and off the
job, and his ability to function in his
position." Step 5 Decision at page 7.
The CSRB conducted no analysis of the nexus issue other
than stating that the Hearing Officer had given adequate
consideration to "the nexus between Kent's off-duty misconduct
and its detrimental relationship -co his employment status,
..."

See Step 6 Decision, Conclusion of Law 9, at page 11.

Thus, we must examine the Step 5 Decision to determine whether
it complies with DeSpain.
The second element of the DeSpain nexus requirement had
15

two (2) components.

First, the employee must have engaged in

off-duty misconduct.

That misconduct is easily identifiable

in that the Department was focused on Kent's misdemeanor
conviction.
policies.

Secondly, the misconduct must violate specific
It is at this point that we encounter difficulties

in this case because there is no evidence that a specific
departmental policy was violated.
The Department attempted to comply with this specific
policy requirement by asserting that the professional
standards contained in the Supervisor's Handbook provides for
dismissal for a conviction involving a crime involving moral
turpitude.

The difficulty with the Department's position is

that the Supervisor's Handbook "is not distributed to anyone
below management level," T.59, lines 18-19, and the Department
did not present any evidence to demonstrate the contents of
the Supervisor's Handbook constituted professional standards
or policies governing employee conduct.
Moreover, the Administrator, Floyd Astin, specifically
testified that the Department disseminates all policies to
employees, to-wit:
"Q. Okay. Tell me how the Department
adopts a policy.
A. We look to guidance, of course, from
the state department, state personnel
department as to things that they would
16

consider grounds for dismissal, to
decisions, to suggestions from legal
counsel, suggestions from personnel
matters, and matters that may have
occurred or may have a repetitious nature
that we feel that employees maybe need to
be specifically notified of, then we'd
bring the matter to what we call our
executive committee composed of a number
of directors in our Department, we review
those, and then based upon those reviewsf
we do recommend that they become a part of
the handbook.
Q. Okay. Now, when you adopt a policy,
do you disseminate that policy to all
employees?
A. All employees receive a copy of that,
yes.
Q.

Okay.

A. Or at least have it available to
them."
T.89, lines 2-21.
Mr, Astin did not know, however, whether the inforraation
concerning dismissal for a criminal conviction had actually
been given to employees:
"Q. Now, under this Dismissals for Cause
provision, you have, "conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude," which is
what you cited in your decision?
A.

Correct.

Q. Can you tell me when that policy was
adopted and disseminated to employees that
that is a basis for dismissal?
A. To my knowledge, this goes sack many
years. I don't — I'm not aware of any —
any dates on that.
17

Q. So can you tell me with certainty
whether or not that information is
actually conveyed to each employee?
A. Each employee is made aware when they
come — employee evaluation when they
first come to the Department that this
information is available as to what
standards are in employee handbooks and
supervisor handbooks. Employee handbooks
are given to all employees and supervisor
handbooks are given to all supervisors
for review by an employee.
Q. Do you know if this provision en
Dismissals for Cause is in tne Employee
Handbook?
A. I couldn't state for certain at this
point. My assumption would be that it
would be, but I just don't know." T.90,
lines 6-25 and T*91, lines 3-7.
The Department thus presented no evidence that any policy
had been adopted, nor that Kent knew of the policy.

To the

contrary, Kent's unrebutted testimony was that he was not
aware of any policy concerning convictions.

T.106, lines 3-6.

The Department thus did not prove a nexus between Kent's offduty conduct and his employment and his dismissal cannot
stand.
Additionally, Kent asserts that DeSpain should be
modified to add a third element, to-wit:

the misconduct must

have occurred within a reasonable time period prior to the
disciplinary action.

Kent believes a reasonable time period

would start one (1) year prior to any disciplinary action.
18

Kent asserts this temporal requirement is necessary for
several reasons.

First, such a nexus requirement would given

substantive meaning to the Min office" language found in
U.C.A. 67-19-18(1).

If the Department and the CSRB are

correct that 'in office" means in employment, then a nexus
time requirement would give the phrase substantive meaning.
To hold otherwise would be simply to ignore the "in office"
language.
Secondly, the time requirement gives some notion of
finality/a bright-line test that management and employees
alike can rely on in making disciplinary decisions.
And finally, imposing a one (1) year time limitation is
fundamentally fair.

Currently, an employee is required to

file a grievance no later than one (1) year after the event
occurs.

See, U.C.A. 67-19a-401(5)(b) (1953, as amended).

If

an employee has a beef with management, he/she has a year in
which to file a grievance.

Why should the street not go both

ways?
In any event, Kent asserts that misconduct that predates
disciplinary action by five (5) years does not and cannot meet
the nexus requirements of DeSpain.

19

III.
KENT CANNOT BE DISCIPLINED FOR CONDUCT
THAT OCCURRED PRIOR TO HIS APPOINTMENT AS
A FIELD AUDITOR.
At the Step 5 evidentiary hearing, Kent argued that he
could not be disciplined while a field auditor for misconduct
that occurred when he was an accountant.

The Step 5 hearing

Officer did not address this issue but the CSRB held (at Step
6) that the term "in office" should be interpreted to mean "an
employee's full term of service, sequentially and
continuously."

See Step 6 Decision at page 7.

Kent disagrees

with the CSRB's interpretation of U.C.A. 67-19-18, (1953, as
amended), which provides that dismissal may occur "for such
just causes as inefficiency, ... or non-feasance in office."
(Emphasis supplied).
Kent submits the phrase "in office" limits the
discretion of the Department to terminate an employee by
statutorily requiring that a "just cause" have occurred
concurrent with the position being occupied by the employee at
the time of termination.

Thus, Kent submits that he cannot be

terminated from his Field Auditor position for conduct that
occurred while he occupied the Accountant's position.
Moreover, Kent maintains his interpretation is consistent with
the Legislature's intent because the Supreme Court incerpreted
20

a statute containing similar language in such fashion.
In State v. Bowen, 620 P.2d 72 (Utah 1980), the defendant
was elected to the Weber County Commission in 1978 and assumed
his duties in January of 1979.

Thereafter, criminal

proceedings were commenced against the newly elected
commissioner and he was convicted of thirty two (32) counts of
having obtained unemployment benefits by false
representations.
Proceedings were then instituted to have Mr. Bowen
removed from his position for violating the then existing
version of U.C.A. 77-5-1 (1953), which provided for
impeachment "upon being convicted of... a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude or malfeasance in office." Id.
(emphasis supplied).

The trial court dismissed the removal

proceedings on the basis that the false representations did
not occur during Commissioner Bowen's term, but in fact,
predated his assumption of duties.

The Supreme Court

affirmed:
"There is a definite conflict in authority
on this question. We think it is implicit
from the above constitutional and
statutory provisions that the offense must
occur while the person is serving in the
office from which it is sought to remove
him. This also seems to be the great
weight of authority." (Citations
omitted). Bowen, at 74.
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While Bowen admittedly deals with an elected official.
Kent asserts the case is persuasive for three (3) reasons.
First, the "in office" language found in U.C.A* 67-19-13 is
identical to the "in office" language interpreted in Bowen.
Since Commissioner Bowen could not be removed for criminal
conduct that did not occur "in office/' Kent likewise should
not be removed for any alleged misconduct that did not occur
"in office" as a fiela auditor.

FurLhet, it is undisputed

that Kent was not a field auditor in 1985-86 when the crimes
occurred and therefore submits he was not "in office" within
the meaning of U.C.A. 67-19-18.
Secondly, the Legislature is presumed to have intended
the "in office" language of U.C.A. 67-19-18 would be
interpreted consistent with Bowen inasmuch as that statute
has been amended on several occasions (most recently in 1991),
since the Bowen decision was issued in 1980.

See, Amax

Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission - 796 P.2d 1256
(Utah 1990) (it is presumed Legislature chooses its words
carefully and advisedly).

Had the Legislature intended "in

office" to mean "in employment" (as held by the CSRB), the
Legislature has had ample opportunity to change the statute to
reflect that intent.

That the Legislature has not amended the

statute infers that the Bowen interpretation is acceptable to
22

them.
Thirdly, the Bowen analysis should apply because other
courts have interpreted the phrase "in office" is limited to
those circumstances where current criminal misconduct is
relevant to current duties.

The New Mexico Supreme Court had

occasion to address such a situation in the case of State v.
Santillanes, 654 P.2d 542 (N.M. 1982).
As in Bowen, the State of New Mexico, in Santillanes,
was attempting to remove a County Commissioner for misconduct
that occurred prior to his current term of office.
Commissioner Santillanes, however, was in his second term of
office as Bernalillo County Commissioner and the corruption
had occurred during his first term.

Prior to trial,

Commissioner Santillanes sought and obtained an order in
limine from the trial court precluding the presentation of any
evidence concerning corruption during his first term.

The

State appealed.
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court held the use of
the phrase "in office" must necessarily limit the evidence of
misconduct to that occurring during the current term and
affilmed the trial court.

In so doing, the Court set forth

the policy considerations supporting this interpretation?
"The object cf a removal statue has been
perceived as protecting "the people from
23

unworthy officers while they were serving
as such officers. The scope of the
accusation must be limited tc a present
term of office because the purpose of
removal is not to determine whether a
public office has been a good person or a
bad person in the past but only to
determine whether, by reason of existing
facts and circumstances, he should be
removed from his present office."
(Citations omitted.) Santillanes, at 544.
The Court further concluded that:
"We agree that 'an officer cannot ... be
removed from office for a violation of his
duties while serving in another office,
or in another term of the same office.7
Thruston v. Clark, 107 Cal. 285, 288, 40
P. 435, 436 (1895)." Id. az 544.
Kent submits Bowen and Santillanes are persuasive
authority for the proposition that Kent cannot be disciplined
for misconduct that occurred prior to his appointment as a
field auditor.

Kent should therefore be reinstated with back

pay to the date of termination.
CONCLUSION
The Department should be ordered to forthwith reinstate
Kent and be further ordered to pay him back pay to December 6,
1991.
Dated t h i s

/ ?

day of

//ZAAASCS

, 1993.

Respectfully submitted,
.ip W. Dy?
Attorney for Petitioner

k/mi/Kent.bri/APPl
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-18 (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated 77-5-1 (1953)(repealed)
R.468-11.1 of the Utah Administrative Code (1992)
R.468-11.2 of the Utah Administrative Code (1992)
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, issued
by the Step 5 Hearing Officer, Sherri Guyon, on March 31, 1992.
Decision issued by the Career Service Review Board, on
October 20, 1992.
Supervisor's Handbook, Separations, Pages 12-1 through 12-

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-18 (1953, as amended)
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(2) (a) Vacancy notices for career service positions shall be publicly announced
d) for periods of time to be determined by
the director, and
in) in a manner designed to attract an optimum number of qualified applicants
(b) The director shall ensure that vacancy notices for career service positions are publicly announced for at least five days
(3) After consulting with agency officials and outsl de experts, the director shall approve the examining
instruments
(4) When a department requests certification of applicants who have passed the tests, the director shall
cer tify applicants on appropriate registers defined by
rules established by the director
(5) The agency head shall make appointments to
fill vacancies from appropriate registers for probationary periods to be defined by rules established by
the director
(6) A person serving a probationary period may not
u s e the grievance procedures provided in this chapter
and m Chapter 19a, Title 67 Grievance and Appeal
Procedures and may be dismissed at any time by the
appointing officer without heanng or appeal
(1) Career service status shall be granted upon the
successful completion of the probationary period iwi
67-19-17. Reappointment of employees not retained in exempt position.
Any career service employee accepting an appointment to an exempt position who is not retained by the
appointing officer, unless discharged for cause as provided by this act or by regulation, shall
(1) be appointed to any career service position
for which the employee qualifies in a pay grade
comparable to the employee's last position in the
career service provided an opening exists, or
(2) be appointed to any lesser career service
position for which the employee qualifies pending the opening of a position described in Subsection (1) of this section The director shall maintain a reappointment register for this purpose
and it shall have precedence over other registers
1979

67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds
— Disciplinary action — Procedure —
Reductions in force.
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or
demoted only to advance the good of the public interest, and for just causes such as inefficiency, incompetency failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of
race, sex, age, physical handicap, national origin, religion, political affiliation, or other nonment factor
including the exercise of rights under this chapter
(3) The director shall establish rules governing the
procedural and documentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions
(4) If an agency head finds that a career service
employee is charged with aggravated misconduct or
that retention of a career service employee would endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave
threat to the public interest, the employee may be
suspended pending the administrative appeal to the
department head as provided in Subsection (5)
(5) (a) No career service employee may be demoted or dismissed unless the department head

67-19-19

or designated representative has complied with
this subsection
(b) The department head or designated representative notifies the employee in writing of the
reasons for the dismissal or demotion
(c) The emplovee has no less than five working
days to reply and have the reply considered by
the department head
(d) The employee has an opportunity to be
heard by the department head or designated representative
(e) Following the heanng, the employee may
be dismissed or demoted if the department head
finds adequate cause or reason
(6) (a) Reductions in force required by inadequate
funds, change of workload, or lack of work are
governed by retention rosters established bv the
director
(b) Under those circumstances
(0 The agency head shall designate the
categorv of work to be eliminated, subject to
review by the director
(u) Temporary and probationary employees shall be separated before any career
service employee
(in) (A) Career service employees shall
be separated in the order of their retention points, the employee with the lowest points to be discharged first
IB) Retention points for each career
service employee shall be computed according to rules established by the director allowing appropnate consideration
for proficiency and for senionty in state
government, including any active duty
military service fulfilled subsequent to
original state appointment
(IV) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in force shall be
(A) placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsection
67-19-17(2), and
(B) reappointed without examination
to any vacancy for which the employee is
qualified which occurs within one year
of the date of the separation
(c) d) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may appeal to the department
he^d for an administrative review
(n) The notice of appeal must be submit
ted within 20 working days after the employee's receipt of wntten notification of separation
(in) The employee may appeal the decis\oft of the department head acsaYdmg to the
grievance and appeals procedure of this act
1991

67-19-19. Political activity of employees —
Rules and regulations — Highway patrol — Hatch Act
Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules
promulgated under this section for federally aided
programs, the following provisions apply with regard
to political activity of career service employees in all
grades and positions
(1) State career service employees may voluntanly participate in political activity subject to
the following provisions
(a) if any state career service employee is
elected to any partisan or full-time nonpartisan political office, that employee shall be

Utah Code Annotated 77-5-1 (1953)(repealed)

U.C.A. 77-5-1, (1953
"All officers of any city, county or other political
subdivision of this state not liable to impeachment shall be
subject to removal as provided in this chapter upon being
convicted of a felony, an indictable misdemeanor, a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude or malfeasance in office."

R.468-11.1 of the Utah Administrative Code (1992)
R.468-11.2 of the Utah Administrative Code (1992)
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

bationary employees shall receive a performance
evaluation at the conclusion of the probationary period and again at July 1 of the calendar year Employees under a constant review status shall be formally evaluated frequently as well as prior to removal from that status
10-1 (3) The employee shall sign the evaluation under all circumstances Signing the evaluation only
denotes the employee has reviewed the evaluation
The evaluation form shall permit the employee's comments, including a space for either agreeing or
disagreeing with the evaluation The employee shall
check one of the spaces The employee may comment,
m writing, either in space provided or on separate
attachment Refusal to sign shall constitute insubordination subject to discipline
R468-10-2. Corrective Actions.
When an employee's performance does not meet established standards for reasons other than willful
misconduct, agency management shall take appropriate documented/clearly labeled corrective action in
accordance with the following rules
10-2 (1) The supervisor shall discuss the substandard performance with the employee in an attempt to
discover the reasons therefor and set forth an appropriate written plan
10-2 (2) Corrective actions shall include one or
more of the following
(2)(a) Closer supervision
(2Kb) Training
(2)(c) Referral for personal counseling
(2)(d) Reassignment or transfer
(2)(e) Use of appropriate leave
(2)(f) Career counseling and out-placement
(2)(g) Period of constant review
(2)(h) Opportunity for remediation
(2)0) Written warnings
10-2 (3) During the implementation of a written
corrective action plan, agency management shall provide frequent evaluation about the employee's
progress
10-2 (4) If, after reasonable effort, the corrective
actions taken do not result in satisfactorily improved
performance, the employee shall be disciplined per
R468-11-1 (2), (3), (4) and (5). The record of the corrective action satisfying the requirement of Section
67-19-18(1)
10-2 (5) DHRM shall provide assistance to agency
management upon request
R468-10-3. Employee Development and Training.
Agency management may establish a program for
training and staff development consistent with these
rules
10-3(1) All agency sponsored training shall be
agency specific or designed for highly specialized or
technical jobs and tasks.
10-3 (2) Agency management shall consult with the
Executive Director, DHRM, where proposed training
and development activities have potential statewide
impact or may be offered most cost effectively on a
statewide basis. The Executive Director, DHRM,
shall determine whether DHRM shall be responsible
for such activities
10-3 (3) The Executive Director, DHRM, shall work
with agency management to establish principles to
guide the development of statewide activities and to
facilitate sharing of resources statewide.
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R468-10-4. Education Assistance.
State agencies may assist employees in their educational goals by either granting administrative leave
to attend classes or subsidizing the educational expense of employees but subject to the following conditions
10-4(1) The educational program will provide a
benefit to the State
10-4 (2) The employee shall successfully complete
the required course work with a passing grade
10-4 (3) The employee shall agree to repay any
such assistance which was received for educational
work completed in the year immediately preceding
voluntary termination
10-4 (4) Education assistance shall not exceed
$1,500 in any one fiscal year Agencies shall have the
prerogative of approving program participation of
any one employee up to and including $1,500, but
shall use contract requirements and standards approved by DHRM Agencies which subsidize education of employees beyond the $1,500 amount shall
receive approval of the respective department head
10-4 (5) When an agency directs an employee to
participate in an educational program, then the
agency shall fully pay the costs thereof
10-4 (6) Educational assistance reimbursements to
employees may be taxable pursuant to IRS regulations
(6)(a) Tuition reimbursement paid for undergraduate college classes shall not be taxable as income
(6)(b) Tuition paid for graduate level classes shall
be taxable as income
1990

67-19-6(5)

R468-11. Discipline.
R468-11-1 Disciplinary Action
R468-11-2 Dismissal or Demotion
R468-11-1. Disciplinary Action.
Noncompliance with these rules, departmental
safety policies, professional standards adopted by a
department, work place policies, and such matters as
inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills,
adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance in office, or failure to advance the
good of the public interest shall be cause for disciplinary action
11-1(1) The type and severity of any disciplinary
action taken shall be governed by principles of due
process which include
(l)(a) Consistent application
(1Kb) Prior knowledge of rules and standards
(l)(c) Determination of fact
(l)(d) Timely notice of noncompliance
(l)(e) Opportunity to respond and rebut as defined
herein
11-1.(2) If the agency determines that a career service employee is charged with aggravated or repetitive misconduct or that retention of a career service
employee would endanger the peace and safety of
others or pose grave threat to the public interest, the
agency, pending an investigation to determine fact
upon which disciplinary action may be taken, shall
utilize one or more of the following options
(2)(a) The employee may be placed on paid administrative leave
(2Kb) The employee may be temporarily reassigned
to another position or different work location at the
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same rate of pay pending the completion of the investigation.
11-1.(3) In all cases, except as provided under Section 67-19-18(2) disciplinary action includes the following:
(3)(a) The agency representative notifies the employee in writing of the proposed discipline and the
reasons therefor;
(3)(b) The employee has five working days within
which to reply in writing and have the reply considered by the agency representative before discipline is
imposed;
(3)(c) An employee waives the right to respond and
discipline may be imposed if the employee does not
reply within the time frames stated in these rules or
as established by the agency representative, whichever is longer.
11-1.(4) After an employee has been informed of the
reasons for the proposed discipline and has been
given an opportunity to respond and be responded to,
discipline may be imposed by the agency representative as appropriate. The type and severity of discipline may take into consideration the severity of the
infraction, the repeated nature of violations, prior
disciplinary actions, previous oral warnings and discussions, the employee's past work record, the effect
on agency operations, and the potential of the violations for causing damage to persons or property. Disciplinary action may include one or more of the following options:
(4)(a) Written reprimand
(4)(b) Suspension of the employee without pay up to
30 calendar days per occurrence requiring discipline.
(4)(c) Demotion of the employee utilizing one of the
following methods as provided by law:
1) An employee may be moved from a position in
one class to a position in another class having a lower
entrance salary if the duties of the position have been
reduced for disciplinary reasons.
2) A demotion within the employee's current pay
range may be accomplished by lowering the employee's salary rate back on the range, as determined
by the agency head or designee.
(4)(d) An agency head shall dismiss or demote an
employee only in accordance with the provision of
Section 67-19-18(3). See R468-11-2 of these rules.
(4)(e) Disciplinary actions are subject to the grievance and appeals procedure as provided by law.
11-1.(5) At the time disciplinary action is imposed
the employee shall be notified of the discipline, the
reasons for the discipline, the effective date and
length of the rfiscipfine and the standard of conduct
necessary to avoid further discipline.
R468-11-2. Dismissal or Demotion.
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for
cause as explained under 10-2 and 11-1 of these rules
as follows:
11-2.(1) An agency head may dismiss an employee
having other than career service status, without right
of appeal, for cause upon providing written notification to the employee specifying the reasons for the
dismissal and the effective date.
11-2.(2) No person shall be dismissed or demoted
from a career service position unless the agency head
or designee has observed the following procedures
and the Grievance Procedure Rules:
(2)(a) The agency head or designee shall notify the
employee in writing of the specific reasons for the
dismissal or demotion.

R468-12-3

(2)(b) The employee shall have no less than five
working days to reply and to have the reply considered by the agency head.
(2)(c) The employee shall have an opportunity to be
heard by the agency head or designee.
(2)(d) Following such a hearing an employee may
be dismissed or demoted if the agency head or designee finds adequate cause or reason.
11-2.(3) Agency management may suspend an employee with pay pending the administrative appeal to
the agency head as provided by law under Section
67-19-18(2).
1990
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R468-12. Separations.
R468-12-1.
R468-12-2.
R468-12-3.
R468-12-4.

Resignation.
Abandonment of Position.
Reduction in Force.
Exceptions.

R468-12-1. Resignation.
An employee may resign by giving written or verbal notice to the appointing authority.
12-1.(11 An employee's resignation may be accepted
without prejudice if received ten working days prior
to its effactive date.
12-1.(2) An employee may withdraw a resignation
on the next working day after its submission. After
the close of the next working day following its submission, withdrawal of a resignation may occur only
With the consent of the appointing authority.
&468-12-2. Abandonment of Position.
An employee who is absent from work for three
consecutive days and is capable of providing proper
notification to his supervisor but does not, shall be
deemed to have abandoned his position. The employee shall be informed of the action in writing by
the appointing authority and shall have appeal rights
Within ten working days of the notice.
&468-123. Reduction in Force.
Reductions in force required by inadequate funds,
Change of workload, or lack of work shall be governed
by the following rules:
12-3.(1) When a reduction in force results in a reduction of staff in one or more classes, and before any
Career service employee is notified of being reduced in
force, the appointing authority shall develop a work
force adjustment plan (WFAP). The following items
ahall be considered in developing the work force adjustment plan.
(l)(a) Categories of work to be eliminated
(1Kb) Inter-changeability of skills
(l)(c) Specifications of measures taken to facilitate
the placement of affected employees through normal
Attrition, retirement, transfer, reassignment, and voluntary relocation
(l)(d) Temporary furlough
The provisions of section R468-8-5.Q2) may be implemented only after all other cost saving methods
have been exhausted. Additionally, the provisions of
section R468-8-5.Q2) may be implemented prior-to a
reduction in force if the furlough results in the necessary cost savings and is consistent with reasons of
business necessity. A reduction in force shall be the
last, unavoidable action taken for cost savings.
(l)(e) A list of all affected employees showing the
retention points for each employee
12-3.(2) No employee may be RIF'd who has not
been identified in a properly developed and approved

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, issued
by the Step 5 Hearing Officer, Sherri Guyon, on March 31, 1992.
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AUTHORITY
In compliance with Utah Code Annotated §67-19a-406, an administrative hearing at
Step 5 was held at 8:30 a.m., February 7, 1992, in Conference Room 1116 of the State
Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah. Charles D. Kent (Grievant), was present
and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law; the Department of Employment
Security (Department and Agency) was represented by Don Avery, Chief of Contributions,
and K. Allan Zabel, Legal Counsel. A court reporter made a verbatim record of the
proceedings; testimony and documentary evidence were received into the record. Witnesses
were placed under oath. This Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, Utah Code Annotated,
Section 63-46b-2(l)(h)) now makes and enters the following:
ISSUES
1.

Is Grievant entitled to prevail on his October 23, 1991 appeal from
termination?

2.

If so, what is the appropriate remedy?
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Grievant was originally hired as an Accountant 17 with the Utah Department of

Employment Security on approximately October 9, 1984; this was not a career service
position. (See Agency Exhibit #5.)
2.

Subsequently, Grievant attained career service status (on approximately

January 13, 1986).
3. On October 6, 1986, Grievant attained the position of Field Auditor 21. (See
Agency Exhibit #6.)
4. In March 1990, Grievant was temporarily assigned to the Clearfield Office as an
Interviewer. (See Grievant Exhibit #7.) Grievant returned to his former position of Field
Auditor in July 1990. Grievant' s Supervisor testified that Grievant was doing an acceptable
job as a Field Auditor; Grievant met the requirements for quantity and quality of work.
(See Grievant Exhibits #4 and #5.)
5. On approximately May 1, 1991, Grievant f s supervisor, Don Avery, learned that
Grievant had been indicted by a federal grand jury for fraudulently endorsing ten
U.S. Treasury checks. (See Grievant Exhibit #2.) Mr. Avery and Grievant discussed the
situation and Grievant assured his supervisor that he was not guilty. Mr. Avery testified that
he told Grievant that if he were found guilty, it would have an impact on his employment.
Grievant was placed under closer supervision and his duties were restricted to reduce his
handling of trust fund moneys. Mr. Avery asked Grievant to keep him informed about the
progress of the indictment situation.
6. On August 8, 1991, Grievant pleaded guilty to one count of fraudulently signing
a U.S. Treasury check, a misdemeanor. (See Grievant Exhibit #3.) His sentencing hearing
occurred on November 1, 1991. (See Agency Exhibit #2.)
7. On October 4, 1991, Grievant's supervisor gave Grievant a written Notification
of Intent to Discipline by dismissal from the Department. Grievant' s supervisor listed the
specific reasons for his recommendation for dismissal that are summarized as follows:
Grievant had entered a plea of guilty to forging an endorsement on a U.S. Treasury check;
Grievant had failed to keep his supervisor apprised of the progress of his case as he had
been specifically requested to do; and, Grievant ! s continued employment was not in the
best interest of the Department because Contributions employees, especially those handling
Trust Fund moneys, must have unquestionable reputations for honesty and trustworthiness.
(See Agency Exhibit #3.)
8. On October 23, 1991, Grievant grieved the recommendation for dismissal. On

October 30, 1991, Grievant f s supervisor advised Grievant that he had considered
Grievant's written response, but that he still recommended dismissal.

(See Agency

Exhibit #1.)
9.

On November 15, 1991, a hearing was conducted for Grievant before the

Administrator of the Department of Employment Security, Floyd G. Astin (Administrator).
On December 3, 1991, A Disciplinary Decision was issued by the Administrator in which
Grievant was informed that he was to be dismissed effective at the close of business
December 6,1991. The reasons for the decision to dismiss were stated and are summarized
as follows:

Grievant had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and, equally as

important, Grievant had failed to keep his supervisor informed of the progress of his case,
even though he had been specifically requested to do so; and, these actions had disabled
him from continued effectiveness as an employee of the Department.

(See Agency

Exhibit #1.)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Grievant is a career service employee with the Department of Employment
Security and is properly entitled to a hearing before the Career Service Review board that
is governed by Administrative Rules R140-1-1 through -22.
2. Human Resource Management Rule R479-11-2 states that following a hearing by
the Department, an employee may be dismissed or demoted if the department head finds
adequate cause or reason. An employee must not be dismissed for arbitrary or capricious
reasons, but rather for "adequate cause or reason."
3. Pursuant to its responsibilities under DHRM Rule R468-11-2, a department head
must exercise discretion to make a determination of "adequate cause or reason.1' The
exercise of discretion must not be abused.
4. Page 12-2 of the Supervisor Handbook for the Department of Employment Security
states that, "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude" is one basis for dismissal for
cause. The reasons listed are not all-inclusive however, and other reasons may be found to
be "adequate cause or reason" by proper exercise of the Agency! s discretion.
5. CSRB Rule R140-l-20(c) states "latitude and consideration" shall be given by
the Hearing Officer to the Agencyf s prior decision.
6. DHRM Rule R468-11-1.(1) states that the type and severity of any disciplinary
action taken shall be governed by principles of due process that include consistent

application, prior knowledge of rules and standards, determination of fact, and timely notice
of noncompliance.
7. DHRM Rule R468-11-1.(4) states that discipline may be imposed by the agency
representative "as appropriate" and that several factors (which are delineated hereafter)
may be taken into consideration in determining the specific type and severity of the
discipline.
DISCUSSION
A. Latitude and Consideration Given to Agency1 s Decision
Grievant asserts that "consideration" not "deference" should be given by the
Hearing Officer to the Departments decision to discipline. The Department concurs and
so does the Hearing Officer. The Administrative Rules of the Career Service Review Board,
at R140-1-20(C) (effective December 16, 1991) states:
Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new
hearing for the record, with both parties being accorded full administrative
due process. The hearing officer shall give latitude and consideration to an
agencyf s prior decision when the latter is supported by the findings of fact
based on the evidence.
As part of the decision-making process of this hearing procedure, the Hearing Officer has
given "latitude and consideration" to the Departmentf s decision to terminate Grievant.
B. Review of the Disciplinary Action Taken
Also, as part of the decision-making process of this hearing procedure, the Hearing
Officer must review the actions the Department took with regard to Grievant to determine:
1) if there was adequate cause for discipline; 2) if substantial evidence existed to show that
due process was followed in notifying Grievant of the action being taken; 3) if the decision
to terminate was reasonable use of agency discretion, and 4) if the discipline was
disproportionate to the actions of Grievant or if it was appropriate under the circumstances.
Human Resource Management Rules (July 1, 1991), states:
R468-11-2 Dismissal or Demotion
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause as explained under
10-2 and 11-1 of these rules as follows:
11-2.(2)

No employee shall be dismissed or demoted from a career
service position unless the agency head or designee has
observed the following procedures and the Grievance
Procedure Rules:

(2)(a) The agency head or designee shall notify the employee in
writing of the specific reasons for the dismissal or demotion.
(2)(b) The employee shall have no less than ten working days to reply
and to have the reply considered by the department head or
designee.
(2)(c)

The employee shall have an opportunity to be heard by the
department head or designee.

(2)(d) Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or
demoted if the department head finds adequate cause or
reason. (Emphasis added.)
Page 12-2 of the Supervisor Handbook for the Department of Employment Security
(January 1990) states:
Dismissals for Cause
Failure to satisfactorily complete probation period.
Failure to report to work
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. (Emphasis added.)
Negligence, inefficiency or unfitness to perform duties.
Violation of Department or State regulations.
Gross misconduct or insubordination.
The rules stated above show that management of an agency has the authority to
terminate an employee for what it considers to be, in the exercise of its discretion, adequate
cause. Several examples of cause are listed, but these are not all-inclusive. Management
may dismiss an employee if it determines there is "adequate cause or reason." In this case,
Grievant's supervisor informed Grievant that he was recommending dismissal because
Grievant had pled guilty to forging an endorsement on a U.S. Treasury check and because
Grievant had failed to keep him apprised of the progress of his case, even though he had
specifically been requested to do so. Grievant ' s supervisor testified that he felt Grievant! s
credibility had been damaged, especially by Grievantf s failure to communicate openly and
honestly with his supervisor. Grievant' s supervisor also testified that he had lost confidence
in Grievant ! s ability to function effectively in his position.
The Administrator conducted a hearing on beh.
with the supervisor's recommendation.

*f Grievant and basically concurred

The Administrator considered Grievant f s

conviction to be a crime of moral turpitude, which was specifically listed as a reason to
dismiss for cause; but even further, he considered Grievant *N S'liire to communicate with
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his supervisor as an equally important cause for dismissal.
Grievant asserted that there were no specific rules of professional conduct delinea
in the Department's rules and regulations and that, therefore, it was an error for the
Department to cite the violation of professional policies as a reason for discipline. The
Administrator testified, however, that he feels there is certain professional conduct that is
"understood" in general by employees in positions such as Grievant f s. It seems to be
generally understood that an employee! s reputation for honesty and trustworthiness must
be without question. This is especially true in a sensitive position such as Grievantf s when
trust fund moneys are involved.
Grievant1 s supervisor and the Administrator testified that they considered the
alternative of transferring Grievant to a different position where the issue of honesty and
trustworthiness would not be so critical, but that another position was not available.
In summation, the Agency determined that Grievantf s credibility had been damaged
by his guilty plea and by his failure to communicate about the indictment process. It also
determined that his conduct had constituted a violation of certain "understood" policies of
professional conduct.

The Agency further determined that it had lost confidence in

Grievant f s ability to function effectively in his present position, and that a realistic
opportunity for transfer did not exist.
Taken altogether, these determinations constitute a finding that substantial evidence
exists to support Agency's decision to discipline Grievant. The Agency followed its own
policies by holding a hearing for Grievant, and it exercised its discretion reasonably by
determining, from the hearing, that "adequate cause" existed for discipline.
C. Time Period of Grievantf s Actions
Grievant asserts that the actions for which he was disciplined did not occur while he
was in his current position, so that he should not properly have been disciplined for them.
While it is true that the forgery occurred while he was in a former position, the guilty plea
and the failure to communicate with his supervisor did occur while he was in his current
position. The actions that led to the finding of "adequate cause or reason" occurred in a
relevant and reasonable time period and were properly used as the basis for discipline.
D. Nexus Requirement
Grievant properly asserted that the Department has the burden to show the nexus
between Grievant' s misconduct and its detrimental effect on his job performance that would

warrant discipline of some sort. Grievant f s supervisor communicated to Grievant in his
Notice of Intent to Discipline that he felt Grievantf s continued employment was not in the
best interest of the Department because employees, especially those handling Trust Fund
moneys, must have reputations for honesty and trustworthiness that are beyond question.
He further testified to this fact at the hearing. The Administrator testified that Grievantf s
actions had caused management to lose confidence in him and his ability to function
optimally; Grievant, the Administrator claimed, had been disabled from continued
effectiveness as an employee of the Department.
The Agency provided the necessary link between Grievant! s actions and the necessity
to discipline him for them, by showing that Grievantf s failure to communicate during the
indictment process, in addition to the guilty plea, both contributed to the Agency! s loss of
confidence in Grievant and to the loss of Grievant1 s credibility to function as an effective
employee in this sensitive position requiring unquestioned trustworthiness and honesty. The
Hearing Officer finds that the Agency carried its burden by providing substantial evidence
to show that a nexus existed between Grievantf s actions on the job and off the job, and his
ability to function in his position.
His credibility as an employee, as well as management' s confidence in him as an
employee, had been impaired by his failure to communicate reasonably or adequately with
his supervisor as he had specifically been requested to do.
E. Severity of Discipline
Human Resource Management Rules (July 1, 1991), R468-11-1.(1) states:
R468-11-1 Disciplinary Action
11-1.(1)

The type and severity of any disciplinary action taken shall be
governed by principles of due process which include:

(l)(a)

Consistent application

(l)(b)

Prior knowledge of rules and standards

(l)(c)

Determination of fact

(l)(d) Timely notice of noncompliance
(l)(e)

Opportunity to respond and rebut as defined herein

Human Resource Management Rules (July 1, 1991), R468-ll-l.(4) states:
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After an employee has been informed of the reasons for the
proposed discipline and has been given an opportunity to
respond and be responded to, discipline may be imposed by the
agency representative as appropriate. In determining the
specific type and severity of the discipline to be taken,
consideration may be given to such factors as the severity of the
infraction, the repeated nature of violations, prior
disciplinary/corrective actions, previous oral warnings, written
warnings and discussions, the employee f s past work record, the
effect on agency operations, and the potential of the violations
for causing damage to persons or property. . . .
When an agency is determining the type and severity of discipline it will mete out to
an employee, several factors must be taken into account, as listed in the above-mentioned
rules. Of particular relevance to the case at hand are the severity of the infraction, any
prior knowledge of rules and standards, any previous oral warnings and discussions, and the
overall effect on the Agency' s operations.
An agency has the discretion to assess the discipline it deems appropriate under the
circumstances. In this case, Grievant pled guilty to one count of fraudulently signing a
U.S. Treasury check, a misdemeanor, which the Department considered to be a crime of
moral turpitude.

Grievant's supervisor testified that new employees go through an

orientation that introduces employees to the policies and procedures of the Department.
Presumably, this includes relevant "rules and standards."

Also, Grievant's supervisor

testified that he had discussed with Grievant the impact that a criminal conviction would
have on his employment. Thus, Grievant had been put on notice that a conviction would
have serious consequences directly related to his job status. The facts reveal that this
discussion took place several months before his court appearance.
Also, Grievant's immediate supervisor and the Administrator both gave evidence
about how the Department's operations would be adversely affected by Grievant's
continued employment. Grievant' s supervisor stated that the Department had worked very
hard to establish an image of having honest and trustworthy employees, and that Grievantf s
continued employment would not be conducive to that image. Both Grievantf s supervisor
and the Administrator stressed that Grievant's failure to communicate with management
during the progress of his case was very distressing to management. They also stated that
their loss of confidence in Grievant's ability to be an effective employee was very
destructive to the employee-employer relationship. This lack of communication weighed

very heavily in the Departmentf s final determination to dismiss Grievant.
Management weighed several factors in making the decision to dismiss Grievant: the
guilty plea to a misdemeanor involving honesty and trust, which were very important aspects
of Grievant f s position; the presumption that Grievant would be aware of certain
"understood" professional behaviors in a position of his level; the oral discussions his
supervisor had with him about the impact a conviction would have on his job status; the
exploration by the Agency of the possibility of transfer for Grievant.

All these were

considered by the Agency in making its determination. The Hearing Officer finds that the
Agency acted reasonably in making its determination to discipline Grievant by dismissal and
that it exercised its discretion with sound judgment and not arbitrarily or capriciously.
DECISION
Based upon the above Findings of fact, Conclusions of Law and Discussion, the
grievance is hereby respectfully denied.
DATED this

&\

day of March 1992.

)HVW
Sherri R. Guyon
CSRB Hearing Officer

RECONSIDERATION
Any request for reconsideration must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten
working days upon receipt of this decision. R140-1-20(M)
APPEAL
Any appeal of this decision must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten working
days upon receipt of this decision. Utah Code Annotated (1989), §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i).
Q
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BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In The Matter Of:

:

CHARLES D. KENT,

:

Grievant and Appellant,

:

v.

DECISION

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Agency and Respondent.

:
:
: Case Nos.: 10 CSRB/H.O. 138 (Step 5)
:
4 CSRB 40 (Step 6)

The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level
review of the above-captioned case on July 21, 1992. The following Board members
participated at the hearing during oral argument and deliberation:
Bruce T. Jones,

Jean M. Bishop,

Kathleen Hirabayashi

and

Chairman

Jose L. Trujillo.

Charles D. Kent (Kent and Appellant) was present and represented by his attorney,
Phillip W. Dyer.

The Utah Department of Employment Security (Department) was

represented by K. Allan Zabel, Legal Counsel for the Department.

A certified court

reporter made a verbatim record of the proceeding before the Board, which is commonly
referred to as a Step 6 appeal hearing.
AUTHORITY
The Board' s authority is set forth in the Grievance and Anneal Procedures Act, Utah
Code Annotated §67-19a-101 through -408 (Supp. 1992). The CSJ ' I \»s regulatory provisions
or administrative rules are published in the Utah Administrative Code §137-1- through -22
(1992 Supp.). This case has proceeded properly through the State' s grievance procedures,
and the Board has assumed jurisdiction over the Appellant • s appeal to Step 6. The Step 6
or Board-level review constitutes the final step in the administrative review process under

the codified Grievance and Appeal Procedures, pursuant to §67-19a-202(l)(a), -407 and 408, as well as constituting a formal adjudication and a final agency action under the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Annotated §63-46b et seq. Following
oral argument, the Board members closed the record and entered into an executive session
for deliberation and decision-making.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Kent was hired in a temporary capacity as a contractual employee in an Accountant,
Grade 17, position on October 9, 1984, by the Department. On April 22, 1985, Kent was
promoted to Accountant, Grade 19. As of January 13,1986, Appellant became a permanent
employee with career service status. Later that year, on October 6, Kent was promoted to
Accountant, Grade 21. In January 1989, Kent applied for and was selected for the position
of Field Auditor II, at the Grade 21 level. Ostensibly due to departmental budget problems
during March 1990, Kent was temporarily transferred to the Clearfield office where he
performed Interviewer tasks, which included handling claims and doing placement work.
Albeit, Kent believed that he had been transferred by the Department in March due to the
Treasury Department's investigation in January into his affairs (T. 108-10, 129, 131).
Appellant was reassigned back to the Departmentf s headquarters where he continued to
serve as a Field Auditor II, until his dismissal in December 1991.
Kent ! s employment difficulties had their origin when he was indicted by a federal
grand jury just prior to May 1991. At that time, Kentf s supervisor, Don Avery, learned that
Appellant had been charged with forging his signature to ten Social Security Administration
checks issued to Kent f s deceased father.

Kent attended a federal court hearing on

August 8,1991, where he plea bargained to a guilty count of fraudulently signing one United
States Treasury check, which constituted a misdemeanor crime rather than the original
felony. In return, the ten felony charges were dismissed. On November 1, 1991, Kent was
sentenced to one count of a misdemeanor crime. Kent's sentence included paying a
restoration amount of $18,207 to the United States government, being placed on probation
for a five-year period, and paying a $2,000 fine.
A month prior to Kent's sentencing, the Department issued him a Notice of Intent
to Discipline, dated October 4,1991. Don Avery, who had been promoted from supervisor
to Chief of Contributions in August 1991 and was now the departmental manager over Kent,
placed Kent on notice of pending discipline, as follows:

You are notified of my intent to recommend to the
Administrator that you be disciplined through dismissal from
this agency.
You are advised of this disciplinary action "to advance the good
of the public interest11 (Utah Code §67-19-18(1)), R468-111.3(a), and pursuant to the following under R468-11.1 for
noncompliance with professional standards adopted by this
Department. The specific reasons for my intent to impose this
disciplinary action are:
On August 8, 1991[,] you appeared before Judge
David K. Winder in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, case number 91-NCR-34W, and entered a plea
of guilty to forging the endorsement "Charles L. Kent" on a
United States Treasury check.
Since May 1, 1991[,] when I learned of your indictment, you
have assured me of your innocence. I asked you to keep me
apprised of the progress of your case, but at no time did you
voluntarily do so. I repeatedly had to request status reports
from you. You also failed to inform me of your August 8 court
appointment and your intentions to plead guilty. During this
entire period your actions have been less than helpful and your
intent misleading.
Contributions employees, especially those handling Trust Fund
monies, must have reputations for honesty and trustworthiness
which are unquestionable. It is not in the best interest of this
Department to have you working in such a responsible position
as that of a Field Auditor subsequent to your admission of guilt
to a criminal act of forgery. (Agency Exh. 3.)
On November 15, 1991, Kent was invited to participate in a pretermination
departmental hearing in order to respond to Averyf s Notice of Intent to Discipline/Dismiss.
The Departmentf s administrator (chief operating officer), Floyd G. Astin, conducted this
hearing. Astin framed the issue he was considering regarding Kent's conduct in his
December 3, 1991 Disciplinary Decision, as follows:
The issue in this matter is whether you should be dismissed
from the Department and [from] state service to advance the
good of the public interest for noncompliance with professional
standards adopted by this Department. Specifically, should you
be dismissed for having been convicted of a crime of moral
turpitude while employed by the Department?
After making factual findings, the administrator made an ultimate conclusion that due

to Kent's "act of forgery and failure to communicate honestly and openly with [your]
supervisor has disabled you from continued effectiveness as an employee of the
Department." (Agency Exh. 1.) Appellant was notified that his dismissal would be effective
on December 6, 1991.
ISSUES
A. Step 5 Issues and Decision
The issues adjudicated by the CSRB' s hearing officer at the evidentiary/Step 5 level
were twofold:
1.

Is Grievant entitled to prevail on his October 23, 1991,
appeal from termination?

2.

If so, what is the appropriate remedy?

The hearing officer first determined that the departmental hearing for Kent had adduced
sufficient evidence to show that adequate cause existed to discipline him (p. 6). Next, the
Step 5 Decision held that the Departmentf s officials had exercised reasonable judgment in
dismissing Kent without the presence of arbitrariness or capaciousness in their decision to
dismiss him (p. 9).
B. Issues Presented Upon Appeal
Appellant offered four legal arguments as a basis for overturning the evidentiary/
Step '5 Decisionf s ruling. In his four points, Kent argued that: (1) the hearing officer had
abused her discretion in finding legal cause to support the Department's termination
decision; (2) because the Department had not previously adopted so-called "professional
standards" as set forth in the termination notice, Kentf s termination is void; (3) Appellant
should not be disciplined for conduct which occurred prior to his last-held position, that of
Field Auditor; and (4) the Department failed in its burden of proving a nexus between
Kentf s misconduct and his job duties.
Appellantf s presentation during the Step 6 oral argument primarily expanded upon
the four above-mentioned points.
C. The Boardf s Standards of Review
R137-1-21 D. sets forth the Board's applicable standards of review as follows:
Standards of Review The boardf s decision shall be based upon
the following:
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1. The board f s standards of review consist of determining:
(a) whether the hearing officerf s evidentiary decision was
supported by substantial evidence; (b) whether that decision is
warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal;
and (c) whether the hearing officer's findings of fact and
conclusions of law are correct and accurate based upon the
evidence in the record.
This tribunal will proceed by carefully reviewing the entire record to determine
whether the decision below contains credible substantial evidence, whether the Step 5
Decision is warranted by the facts and circumstances, and whether the evidentiary factual
findings are correct and accurate based upon the record evidence. Moreover, in addition
to the correctness of the factual findings, we will consider their reasonableness. In reviewing
the Step 5 record as a whole, the Board will further consider whether the hearing officer
correctly applied the relevant policies, administrative rules, and statutes.
D. Burden of Proof at Step 6
At the evidentiary/Step 5 level, the burden of proof as well as the burden of going
forward were borne by the Department due to the Kentf s dismissal, which resulted in the
loss of a vested property interest, that of his continued employment, benefits, and indicia
of office. As Kent is the appealing party at the appellate/Step 6 level, he shoulders the
burden of proof as the moving party to this review.
DISCUSSION
The Department' s officials learned about the indictment against Appellant about
April 30, 1991, when a local newspaper published an article about the charges. Avery
discussed the charges with Kent, and the latter then told Avery that he was innocent of any
wrongdoing. At hearing, Avery recalled that Kent had told him that his brother had been
the person who endorsed the ten federal checks, not Kent (T. 37). According to Avery,
Kent professed his innocence (T. 37). Furthermore, Avery told Kent at that time that if
Kent were proven guilty, it would effect his employment (T, 39, 45). During this first
conversation, Avery further told Appellant to keep him (Avery) informed regarding the
status of the indictment and the progress of Kent f s court case (T. 40). Supervisor Avery
promptly placed Kent under a corrective action/work plan of "closer supervision" and
immediately restricted his handling of all Trust Fund monies (T. 42-43). Avery testified that
Kent never voluntarily came to him to update his supervisor on the status of his court case,
including the August 8, 1991 court date (T. 56-47).
5

Appellant argues that the CSRB hearing officer relied upon her own notion of
"adequate cause" to sustain the Department's termination of Kent, and that the fact
finder's reliance upon R468-11-21 is erroneous in that "adequate cause" is not the same
as "just cause."2 While §67-19-18(1) employs the term "just causes," the Human Resource
Management Rules use "cause" and "for cause" terminology. More specifically, Kent posits:
"The appropriate standard is to first determine whether an appropriate 'cause 1 for
termination exists under R468-11-1 and then the fact finder must determine if that cause is
adequate or sufficient" (Brief, p. 8). Kent urges that a two-prong test is involved in
dismissal cases: first, that the fact finder must find a specific legal cause which must rise to
the level of "adequate cause" as set forth in the Human Resource Management Rules
R468-11 et seq.; then the trier of fact must essay whether the legal cause/adequate cause
meets the "just cause" standard. Appellant's conclusion is that, "Since the fact finder
failed to first make a finding of any ' cause' under R468-11-1, the Decision below is without
reason or rationality and cannot be sustained." {Ibid.).
We disagree with Appellant' s distinguishing between "just cause" and "for cause,"
"cause," and "adequate cause." The Board believes that these terms are synonymous and
fully interchangeable in practice and usage, both as set forth in the State Personnel
Management Act and in the Human Resource Management Rules. The trier of fact used the
term "adequate cause" in the Step 5 Decision; this same term is found at R468-ll-2.(2)(d)
("adequate cause or reason."). The hearing officer properly relied upon this rule, and the
rule is not inconsistent with statutory intent or meaning.3
This tribunal further holds that there is little if no distinction between "good cause"
(or "just cause") and the statutory basis for discipline which sets forth the ground of "to
advance the good of the public interest." The latter is comparable to the federal civil
service' s "efficiency of the service" criterion. Importantly, the hearing officer found that
the Department had relied not upon one ground or reason for Kent' s dismissal but had
relied upon a collective basis, when she summarized that:
Management weighed several factors in making the decision to
dismiss [Kent]: the guilty plea to a misdeme . ; involving
honesty and trust, which were very important .'^pects of
Grievantf s position; the presumption that Grievant would be
aware of certain "understood" professional behaviors in a
position of his level; the oral discussions his supervisor had with
him about the impact a conviction would have on his job status;
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the exploration by the Agency of the possibility of [of a job]
transfer for [Kent]. (Step 5 Decision, p. 9.)
The record shows that Administrator Astin considered the above-mentioned factors in the
weighing of his decision at the departmental hearing (T. 74-77, 78, 79, 80, 82, passim).
Appellant avers that the phrase "in office" in the dismissal/demotion statute at
§67-19-18(1) means that the cause giving rise to any disciplinary penalty must occur while
the accused state employee is serving in the position concomitant to the time the infraction
occurs. In this instance, Kent claims that because his check forging activity took place
during 1985-86 when was an Accountant, he should not be punished in 1991 when he held
the position of Field Auditor. This argument must be rejected. It makes no sense, for
example, that a bank teller who embezzled bank money two years ago and was not'caught
then but has since become a loan officer, but cannot now be punished because the former
teller did the embezzling before becoming a loan officer. Rather, throughout his seven year
term with the Department, Kent had substantial fiscal responsibilities in the collecting,
accounting, and auditing of monies being paid into the Departmentf s Trust Fund. Kent ! s
off-duty misconduct cannot be overlooked or voided simply because he was serving in a
different position when the federal indictment took place.
The Board holds that "in office" as used in §67-19-18(1) refers to an employeef s full
term of service, sequentially and continuously. Career service employees continue to work
indefinitely until their death, resignation, retirement, dismissal, etc. There is no specific
term for being "in office" as used in the above mentioned statute. This use of "in office"
is legally distinguishable from that of elected officials who may be held accountable for their
actions during a particular elected term of service, while they are "in office" as an elected
official. See State v. Bowen, 620 P.2d 72 (Utah 1980). That Kent ! s federal violations
occurred five or six years ago is not a stale incident, nor does the time lapse mitigate his
crime.
APPELLATE CONCLUSIONS
Appellant maintains that the Step 5 Hearing Officer "made findings only that tend
to support the Department's termination of Grievant."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 1.)

The

Department ! s brief accepted the hearing officerf s Step 5 findings of fact, except to correct
Kent ! s promotion trail to show that Appellant was promoted in October 1986 to
Accountant 21, rather than to Field Auditor 21; not until January 1989, did Kent become
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a Field Auditor. We correct the record below, accordingly, and note this correction as de
minimis. Other than the just-mentioned Accountant/Field Auditor correction, we fully
accept the factual findings of the evidentiary/Step 5 Decision and adopt them as our own
findings.

As a matter of law, the Board now makes and enters the following legal

conclusions:
1. Grievant was indicted on felony charges for fraudulently endorsing ten United
States Treasury checks while holding the position of Field Auditor II, Grade 21. Kent pled
guilty to the crime of filing a false claim with the Social Security Administration. A guilty
plea is equivalent to a conviction. Kent admitted forging the signature of his deceased
father on the ten Treasury checks.
conviction of forgery.

The plea bargain resulted in one misdemeanor

Felony forgery and misdemeanor fraud are violations of moral

turpitude.
2. In 1985-86, when Kent committed the just-mentioned felony crime, he held an
Accountant job title with the working title of Collections Officer. As a Collections Officer,
Kent collected unemployment contributions and benefits overpayments, which belonged to
the Unemployment Compensation Fund, pursuant to §35-4-9. At the time of his federal
indictment in 1991, Kent held an even more responsible position of Field Auditor in which
capacity he audited employers to insure their compliance with the statutory tax obligations
that require employers to pay into the Unemployment Compensation Fund, and to collect
those taxes which are due as a result of the audits he performed.

Both as

Accountant/Collections Officer and as Field Auditor, Appellant served in a fiduciary
capacity {Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth edition, p. 625). Through his acknowledged forgery
and plea bargaining, Kent violated his fiduciary responsibilities with his employing agency
by damaging his professional reputation, by raising legitimate doubts and concerns about his
honesty and trustworthiness, and by his conviction of a moral turpitude crime.
3.

When his federal indictment came to light, Kentf s supervisor, Don Avery,

directed Appellant to keep Avery informed regarding his status with the court, including the
progress of his case. Kent had a responsibility to keep Avery informed about the processing
of his case given Kent' s fiscal duties (excluding matters involving attorney-client privilege,
but only intimations of Kentf s probable plea), but he failed to carry out that directive.
Appellant also professed his innocence to Avery of the forgery charges , but later pled guilty
through plea bargaining. As a result Averv lost confidence in Kent ! s abilitv to perform his

duties. By his failure to keep Avery informed of his judicial status as directed, and by his
later plea bargain (openly acknowledging his guilt to fraud), Kent breached the level of
confidence and trust which the Department ! s officials had placed in him. Due to Kent ! s
fiduciary capacity, this breach of confidence and trust constituted aggravated misconduct.
Therefore, the Department was justified in dismissing Kent in order to advance the good
of the public interest pursuant to §67-19-18(1).
4. The Departmentf s Supervisor Handbook lists as a cause for dismissal: "Conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude." (Grvt. Exh. 1; Agency Exh. 4.) Appellant, who was
not a supervisor or manager, had not received a copy of the handbook during his years of
employment with the Department. Appellant averred that he had no knowledge of these
professional standards prior to dismissal proceedings (T. 105). Admittedly, this handbook
does not apply the term "professional standards," but it explicitly sets forth several grounds
as dismissal for cause, including a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude.

Human

Resource Management Rules (July 1991 edition), at R468-11-1, states in part:
"Noncompliance with these rules, departmental safety poHcies, professional standards
adopted by a department, work place policies,... failure to advance the good of the public
interest shall be cause for disciplinary action." (Emphasis supplied.) This provision of the
Human Resource Management Rules is applicable to all career service employees, including
Kent, regardless of whether one has personal knowledge of the rule or not. There are
certain moral standards, such as integrity, trustworthiness, and honesty, which need not be
written into an employerf s policies and work place rules. The public employing agency may
reasonably expect adherence to such unwritten universal moral standards, which if breached,
would substantially tarnish an employee's reputation and strain if not rupture the
employment relationship.
5. It is not relevant that Appellant had not received a copy of the Department' s
Supervisor Handbook prior to his dismissal. Proper conduct and professional standards
include certain moral standards that do not need to be explicitly written and disseminated
to each employee in the public work force. A serious offense in criminal law, such as
forgery, for one who holds a position such as an Accountant, a Collections Officer, and a
Field Auditor rises to a level of moral turpitude. The standard of moral turpitude need not
be written as a specific agency policy, which would include every possible infraction, since
a reasonable person would understand that such intentional wrongdoing and base
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impropriety would be destructive of one f s employment relationship. Clearly a universal
standard of truthfulness,-integrity, trustworthiness, and a reputation not blemished by an act
or acts of forgery may be expected of one holding the job title of "auditor." Given the
seriousness of Kentf s wrongdoing and its inherent impropriety, and considering Kentf s job
duties and responsibilities, the Department did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed
Appellant for his egregious actions.
6. Kent claims that because he was an Accountant/Collections Officer at the time
that he committed acts of forgery during 1985-86 and that by the time of his indictment and
sentencing in 1991 he was a Field Auditor, he should not be so severely sanctioned as to
lose his career employment. This argument is not sufficiently persuasive as to mitigate
Kentf s dismissal. The Department was justified in removing Kent from his position where
"there is the potential of [his] handling or manipulating trust fund monies.1' (Grvt. Exh. 2.;
see also Class Specification for Field Auditor 21, Agency Exhts. 5 and 6, respectively.) Nor
did the Department have an obligation in this instance to place Appellant in a position
which lacked fiscal responsibilities and had a lower trust level than Field Auditor.
7. Avery ! s Notification of Intent to Discipline listed two reasons for pending
dismissal:

"to advance the good of the public interest" and "noncompliance with

professional standards adopted by this Department."

(Agency Exh. 3.)

Administrator

Astin's December 3, 1991 Disciplinary Decision included two reasons for dismissing Kent:
his "act of forgery and [his] failure to communicate honestly and openly with [his] supervisor
has disabled [him] from continued effectiveness as an employee of the Department."
Clearly, an act of forgery by a Field Auditor falls within the ambit of a crime of moral
turpitude and would also serve as a basis for just cause under noncompliance with
professional standards required of a public employee, as well as falling under the standard
designed to advance of the good of the public interest. The department head also found
adequate cause for dismissal due to Kent's failure to keep !

supervisor informed

regarding the processing of Kent's case in court. Appellant had i

'uty or obligation to

disclose his defense or his plea in court to his employer nor t^ ' ospass upon his own
Constitutional rights as to his plea, but he did have an obligation u

port on the processing

and status of his case at it proceeded in court, as requested by Aw cry in early May 1991.
The record contains sufficient evidence of a credible nature to justify Kent' s dismissal based
upon the broad provision of advancing the good of the public interest and noncompliance

with inherent professional standards which would eschew any act of forgery or fraud
involving federal funds.
8. Anent the Board' s standards of review, we conclude that the record evidence
meets the substantial evidence requirement of §67-19a-406(2)(c).

The decision by

Department officials to dismiss Appellant was a reasonable exercise of managerial discretion
given the facts and circumstances of this case. We find no reversible error in the Step 5
Decisionf s findings of facts and conclusions of law. Those findings and conclusions are
reasonable and rationale on their face. The CSRB hearing officer concluded properly that
adequate cause existed to support Kent's dismissal pursuant to R468-11-2. Concededly,
some agencies in state government may have transferred Kent from his fiduciary
responsibilities to a ministerial role, such as Interviewer. Other agencies may have imposed
a sanction of less than termination, such as demotion, suspension, or some combination
thereof. Reasonable minds may differ as to the reasonableness of a disciplinary penalty.
We hold that the Department's decision to terminate Kent's employment was neither
arbitrary, capricious, excessive, an abuse of discretion, nor in violation of merit principles
in public employment. Essentially, the facts supported the charges against Kent, and the
charges rise to such a level as to warrant dismissal, if the Department is so disposed.
9. The CSRB hearing officer gave adequate consideration in her Conclusions of Law
to the correlation between: the Supervisor Handbook which denoted a conviction of a crime
of moral turpitude as a "for cause" justification for dismissal, the employer' s expectation
of "understood" professional conduct as contrasted with private life misbehavior, the time
period when Kent's illegal actions took place, the nexus between Kent's off-duty
misconduct and its detrimental relationship to his employment status, the severity of the
penalty, and the weighing of the evidence and analysis of the parties' respective arguments.
The fact finder then concluded that the Department had met its burden of substantial
evidence under §67-19a-406(2)(a).

Moreover, the hearing officer observed all of the

witnesses' demeanor, heard their testimony firsthand, and then assigned levels of
credibility to both Kent's and Avery's testimony. The Step 5 Decision shows that the
trier of fact found Kent' s testimony less convincing, and obviously less creditable than
Avery' s as to whether Kent kept Avery informed about the status of his court case as
requested (Step 5 Decision, pp. 5-6).
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MOTION TO REOPEN STEP 5 HEARING AND CROSS-APPEAL
After adjournment of the Step 5 proceeding and the closing of the record on
February 7,1991, the Department motioned the CSRB hearing officer to reopen the record
and the proceeding to take the testimony of Mr. Dean Kimber, former Chief of the
Contributions Section, who retired in August 1991. According to the Department, the
purpose of reopening the hearing and taking Kimber f s testimony was to show:
"Mr. Kimber has denied to [counsel] that [Kent] informed him of the progress of the federal
prosecution other than at one time shortly after [Kentf s] indictment, when Mr. Kimber
approached [Kent] about the matter.f(Agencyfs Motion To Reopen Hearing). Following
briefing by both parties, including a proffered affidavit by Kimber, the Board' s hearing
officer denied the request to reopen the record. Subsequently, the Department has crossappealed on the single issue the hearing officerf s denial of a reopening of the record and
the taking of rebuttal testimony.
The Board concludes that because the hearing officer f s Step 5 Decision is affirmed
below, there is no prejudice to the Department regarding the absence of Kimber' s rebuttal
testimony. Therefore, it is not necessary to rule on the propriety of whether or not the
Step 5 proceeding should have been reopened. That matter is mooted by the Board ! s
sustaining the Departmentf s dismissal of Appellant.
DECISION
Appellantf s appeal to the Board at Step 6 of the State' s grievance and appeal
procedures is denied.
DECISION UNANIMOUS,
Bruce T, Jones, Chairman
Jean M. Bishop, Member
Kathleen Hirabayashi, Member
Jose L. Trujillo, Member
DATED this20thday of 0 c t o b e r l ^ 9 2 r - ^ _ _

^

Briice T. Jones^"^ 7
Chairman (
J
Career Service Review Board

ENDNOTES
1. R468-11-2 states: "An employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause as explained under R468-10-2 and
11-1 of these rules as follows . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
2. Utah Code Annotated, £67-19-18(1) states:
Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted only to advance the
good of the public interest, and for just causes such as inefficiency,
incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels,
insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance,
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. (Emphasis supplied.)
3. Employee relations literature is replete with authorities' references to the interchangeability of such terms as
"just cause," "cause," "good cause," "for cause," "adequate cause," etc. See, for example, Lex K. Larson's Unjust
Dismissal, p. 1-2; Public Employment Discharge and Discipline, (Employment Law Library), p. 3-1; How
Arbitration Works (3rd ed.) by Elkouri and Elkouri, p. 612; from the American Arbitration Association Robert
Coulson's Hie Termination Handbook, p. 121.

RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code
Unannotated §63-46b-13.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated
§63-46b-14 and -16.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing DECISION In The Matter of:
Charles D. Kent v. Utah Department of Employment Security has been sent via the U.S. Postal
Service or hand delivered to the following:
Charles D. Kent
1658 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

K. Allan Zabel
Chief Counsel
Dept. of Employment Security
HAND DELIVERED

vfti
hillip W. Dyer
Attorney at Law
318 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
HAND DELIVERED
Floyd G. Astin
Administrator
Department of Employment Security
HAND DELIVERED

Don Avery
Chief of Contributions
Department of Employment Security
HAND DELIVERED
Douglas O. Olsen
Personnel Manager
Department of Employment Security
HAND DELIVERED

DATED this 20th day of October 1992.
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*&Z

Claudia L. Jones
/
Secretary
Career Service Review Board

Supervisor's Handbook, Separations, Pages 12-1 through 12-

I. Separations

XIL

SEPARATIONS

Separations from the Department fall into the following categories:
Voluntary
Resignation
An employee may resign by giving written notice to his or her supervisor, who in turn sends it up
the line. A resignation will be accepted without prejudice if received 10 working days before its
effective date. If less notice is given, a letter of this fact may be placed in the employee's personnel file.
A resignation may be withdrawn on the next working day after its submission. Withdrawal of a
resignation at a later time may occur only with the consent of the Administrator.
When an employee submits a letter of resignation, the letter or a copy should be forwarded
immediately to the Personnel and Training Section, and Form 451 should accompany the letter.
Any employee who resigns, after giving adequate prior notice, will receive all terminal leave pay
in thefinalcheck, which will be issued on the regular payday after the employee's last working day.
The Employee Termination Check-Out Sheet (Form 470, Exhibit 14) is to be completed on each
terminating employee and transmitted to the Personnel section within three (3) days following the
termination date. As each item of information on the form is considered, it should be filled out,
initialed off or marked "NA" (not applicable) so that it is clear that nothing has been overlooked.
Abandonment of Position
An employee who is absent from work for 3 consecutive days and is capable of giving proper
notification, but does not inform the supervisor, shall be deemed to have abandoned his/her position.
The employee shall be informed of the action in writing by their supervisor. A copy of this letter
should go up the line to the Personnel and Training Section. The employee shall have appeal rights
within 10 working days of the notice.
Retirement
An employee may retire at any time as provided for in the retirement plan they participate in.
They shall give adequate notice of their plans to retire.
No employee will be required to retire or be removed from Department service for reasons
unrelated to work performance.
Involuntary S e p a r a t i o n s - Without Prejudice
Reduction in F o r c e
State regulations provide that employees may be separated without prejudice because of
inadequate funds, change of workload, or lack of work.
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A reduction in force is governed by the Department's work force adjustment plan. A copy of the plan
will be available to all affected staff when reductions are necessary.
Retention points shall be calculated on all career employees by the length of continuous State service
and a job proficiency score. An average of the last three annual performance ratings will be used as a
proficiency score. When less than three ratings are available the average of those given will be used. Each
employee's job proficiency score and length of service score shall be added together to produce the
retention score.
The order of separation will befirsttemporary employees (TLNC), second probationary, and third
tenured employees in order of their retention scores. In cases of a tie, the employee with the least seniority
shall be released first.
Employees who are separated due to a reduction in force shall be given written notification of
separation. They may appeal to the Administrator for review if the appeal is submitted within 10 working
days from receipt of their written notification. The employee may appeal the Administrator's decision
according to the appeal procedure of the Career Service Review Board.
A reinstated rif d employee is not required to serve a probationary period and enjoys the rights and
privileges of a regular career service employee.

Dismissals for Cause
Failure to satisfactorily complete probation period.
Failure to report to work.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. ^
Negligence, inefficiency or unfitness to perform duties.
Violation of Department or State regulations.
Gross misconduct or insubordination.
Written notification from the Administrator specifying the reasons for the dismissal, and the effective
date, must be given the employee.
The following procedures must be observed in dismissing or demoting employees having career
service status:
1.

The Administrator or designated representative shall notify the employee in writing of the
reasons for the dismissal (or demotion).

2.

The employee shall have at least five working days to reply and have the reply considered by the
Administrator.

3.

The employee shall have the right to be heard by the Administrator or representative.

4.

Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if the Administrator finds
adequate cause or reason.

5.

The Administrator may suspend an employee without pay pending the outcome of dismissal
proceedings.
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Recommendations for dismissal or demotion of career status employees should be made by the
immediate supervisor and sent up the line. All pertinent documents, such as performance evaluations,
notes relating to previous discussions, notes pertaining to oral reprimands, etc., should accompany the
recommendations.
Career status employees have the right to formally appeal suspensions or dismissals. Information
concerning this procedure is given on page 13-1. A time limited non-career, or probationary employee may
be dismissed without right of appeal.
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss ,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Phillip W. Dyer, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
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BRIEF OF PETITIONER

upon the
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Salt Lake City, Utah
84114

on the

//

day of /^u^L

, 1993

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / O

Notary Public
My Coitimissio|^««j^^e«*^^««^^^«••-•-Residing ats
I j^gSsih1^
Notary PubBc
•
1 &SS*&^ KATHLEEN J. QILLMAN •
\
318 Keams Building I
i Salt Lake City, Utah 8f101 !
• XkViSSi&jkJ
MyCommission Expires I
.- ^ W
becember23,1995
I.
^ gl ^^ W
^
State of Utah

day of

7 7]
//

C a i r T.^Ve*
CmlvA \j TTi-ah
^ - ^ 1,ajce LOU^rLy / u'-an

